Posted 1:45 PM by Floyd

Bill Quick and Stephen Green are arguing about the efficacy of Bush's "rope-a-dope" plan for combating terrorism. Quick has been complaining that the administration is going nowhere; Green said that things are going according to plan and that Iraq will be invaded soon; Quick then pointed out that Bush supporters have been predicting that war will start in October, then November, then January or February, and finally April.

There is no way to say who is correct at this point; only the passage of time can render judgement. I do think that there is a good reason why the attack on Iraq is being dragged out so long, and I will get to that in my next post. (Provided that my satellite dish can push microwaves past all the falling H2O.) Right now I will get to work on something that has been bugging me for a while, and that is the error of rope-a-dope.

The phrase "rope-a-dope" is applied in the blogosphere -- I believe originally by InstaPundit -- to describe and excuse the less savory elements of America's foreign policy. The two actions most frequently cited are the coddling of Al Qaeda Lifetime Patron Saudi Arabia, and the bowing and scraping before the United Nations re Iraq. The idea of rope-a-dope is that Bush allows himself to be pushed around and constrained by his opposition; then he emerges with new actions and policies to punish his enemies and break out of his self-imposed box.

I argue that rope-a-dope is not a good idea. At best it is a waste of time and diplomatic energy; at worst it will lead to failure. The reason is that rope-a-dope is a tactic, not a strategy; and it is suited to physical contests but not political or moral fights.

Ali coined the phrase "rope-a-dope"; he was describing a tactic where he would hang near the ropes, ducking his opponent's efforts to attack him; then later when his opponent was tired from the effort of punching, Ali would finish him off. Note that to Ali, "rope-a-dope" described the physical actions taken in a fight. He did not hold meetings with luminaries in the boxing world to ask whether it would be appropriate for him to prevail over Liston or Frazier or Foreman.

The greatest rope-a-doper was probably Fabius the Delayer. In the second Punic War Hannibal of Carthage crossed over the Alps into Italy and demolished the Romans in three battles. Then he started to persuade the Italian locals to abandon Rome. Rome was not strong enough to challenge Hannibal directly, but neither could they sit behind their walls and allow him to subvert the peninsula. Fabius' strategy was to harass Hannibal, but withdraw whenever Hannibal threatened combat. Thus Hannibal could never have a secure base for his attempts at subversion, nor could he destroy more Roman forces. This bought Rome enough time to hang on to their Italian possessions and then attack the Carthaginians afield -- first in Spain, then in Africa. Again, rope-a-dope was a military tactic. Strategically, the Romans remained committed to the use of their naval supremacy and to the eventual destruction of Italy. They were merciless, not conciliatory, in their policy toward recalcitrant Italians and toward external foes like Philip of Macedon.

Rope-a-dope is an appropriate strategy if you are weak but expect to get stronger, or if you think you can make an opponent overextend himself. Neither is the case for post-9/11 America. America has tremendous advantages in military power and economic might. Our cause is just and our enemies vile. Furthermore we cannot expect to gain by waiting for small teams of suicidal warriors to attack; we must strike first. All our advantages would be thrown away by the policy of rope-a-dope.

I wanted to discuss rope-a-dope because it is a powerful meme in the blogosphere. But I don't think that the Bush administration considers rope-a-dope to be its foreign policy. I will explain the reason for the slow progress of the war on terror in my next post.